Introduction
Theodore Beza’s De Jure Magistratum
(On the Rights of Magistrates) was published in 1574, in reaction to the 1572 massacre
of St. Bartholomew’s Day. This work is typically seen as rejecting the majority
of Protestant thought on this subject, to that time (including the views of
Luther, Melanchthon, and Calvin), and has, since it’s publication, almost
become the standard Calvinist text on the subject. Through our exposition of
his thought, we will show, however, that Beza’s thought is more a “development”
of the views of Luther, Melanchthon, and Calvin (which clearly influenced Beza’s
reflections), than a refutation or rejection of their views. First, however,
some background details.
Philip Melanchthon’s thoughts on the
respective duties of the civil magistrate and Christian subjects were published
in the 1521 edition of his Loci Communes, and revised numerous times
afterwards. Luther’s treatise on the relative power of civil magistrates was
published in 1523, around the same time that the German knights led a revolt
against the Catholic church and the Holy Roman Empire, and a year before the
devastating Peasants war. Melanchthon and Luther are in substantial agreement
on the subject. The final edition of Calvin’s Institutes was published
in 1559, and include an entire chapter on the civil duties of both magistrate
and subject. Calvin agreed entirely with Melanchthon and Luther, though he is
more rigid on the obedience due to the civil magistrate than Melanchthon (who
allowed for the possibility of disobeying, in private, a tyrannical command,
law, or ruling).
During the middle ages, the 2-sword
theory of the relationship between church and state, was commonly accepted. The
temporal sword belonged to the civil magistrate, and the spiritual sword to the
church. Contrary to the claims of some, the church’s sword did not allow it to “execute”
anyone, only to “excommunicate” them from the church. The temporal sword of the
magistrate, however, could be used to physically and temporally punish the
guilty (whether they be guilty of a moral crime or of heresy), even condemning
the guilty to death. As such, for most of the medieval ages, if a heretic was
ever actually killed, it was the temporal sword of the civil magistrate that
brought about the execution (usually after the church had excommunicated the
person in question, handing them over to the temporal magistrate to do with as
they pleased). Death was not the most common punishment. Banishment or house arrest
were more common.
By the 15th century, the
political structures of Europe were in a state of disarray. Ecclesiastical chaos
contributed to the disarray, as rival popes were established in different
cities, and the existing magistrates then swore allegiance to the different popes.
This was known as the Great Schism.[1] In
the late 1300s, Pope Urban VI was named, and then deposed and replaced by
Clement VII. However, Urban VI did not give up his title. At this point, about
half of Europe took the side of Urban VI and the other half supported Clement
VII. It wasn’t till the mid-fifteenth century that this mess was finally sorted
out.
Furthermore, during that same time, the older Feudal
system was rapidly being replaced by sovereign states, such that, by the time of
Luther, the political makeup of Europe was significantly different from that of
the previous 300 to 400 years. The feudal system was a complex interplay of
relations: between the various levels of civil rulers, between the civil and
ecclesiastical powers, and between civil magistrates and their subjects. The
civil magistrates were dependent upon the church for their power to rule (they
received the temporal sword from the Church) and were dependent upon their
vassals (who had their own rights and responsibilities) for all material power
(not only for working the lands, but also as, when needed, armed soldiers for
protecting the state).
During the high middle ages and
early renaissance period, this all began to change. The highest level of civil
rulers began to obtain more independent wealth and power. This gave them the
ability to support armies (thus they were less dependent on their vassals for
armed protection of their lands),[2]
and this allowed them to gain independence from each other and from the church.[3] Eire
notes that through these developments, “Whether as kingdoms or republics,
sovereign states were gaining the capacity to claim their own identity, steer
their own course, and resist outside interference, even from the pope in Rome…By
1515 Western Europe was no longer an assemblage of various peoples linked by a
common religion and a common feudal sociopolitical structure. Europe was a collection
of states, each capable of going its own way, and each capable of fighting for
itself and its traditions, and capable of creating its own churches, in
defiance of Rome.”[4]
With the development of these independent states came the rise of nationalism. Take,
for example, the birth of the state which would become known as Spain, through
the combining of the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon, in 1469. By 1481, the Monarchs
of Spain were already extending their borders, and reclaiming land from the Muslims.[5] Also
of importance was the emergence of France as a world power in the early 16th
century.
These changes in Ecclesiastical and
Civil power raised questions of the role of civil authorities in religion, of
the rights of magistrates and their subjects, and of the respective duties of civil
magistrates and citizens. The role played by the civil magistrates, in the defense
of the Protestant Reformation, cannot be downplayed. The reformers did not
hesitate to provide answers to these questions. We have already looked at the
responses given by Luther, Melanchthon, and Calvin. We turn, now to the influential
approach of Theodore Beza, as articulated in his De Jure Magistratum.[6]
Before we consider questions related to civil disobedience, or positive revolt
against tyrants, we need to lay down the primary principles and the political
framework with which Beza is working.
The Relationship between the Law and the Civil Ruler
In regard to the types of law, Beza
essentially accepts the traditional Medieval and early Reformed division of the
Law into (1) Divine, (2) Natural, and (3) Human. Also following medieval and early
Reformed tradition, Beza claims that all human laws, to be just, depend upon
Natural law.[7]
Beza will, in fact, use some of the principles of Natural Law to demonstrate
his arguments concerning the nature of contracts (and when they may be
legitimately broken), and the nature of just and pious laws (and how to recognize
an unjust law).[8]
For Beza, it is a principle of natural law that, any “ordonnance” that requires
a person to act unjustly or impiously, or to do something which is clearly repugnant
to morality and manifestly sinful, is an unjust law, and, therefore, not a law.[9] Obedience
to such an ordonnance would be, in fact, to break the law. The examples which
Beza provides include murder, mutilation, and idolatry.[10]
Concerning the relationship of the civil leader to the
law, Beza follows the lead of Medieval Theologians and the earlier generation
of Reformed theologians in clearly noting that the station of rulers is
established by God, and notes that this has been taught not only in the Scriptures,
but also by the great pagan philosophers and poets.[11] However,
suggests Beza, also following the eminent tradition that flows out of the Greek
philosophers, though the station of ruler is established by God, individual
rulers (1) must be recognized by the people and their rule is based upon the
assent of the people,[12]
and (2) are necessarily under the Law—they owe as much obedience to the Law as
the people.[13]
The Three “Stations” of Civil Life
Beza elaborates on an idea that was
already found in the previous generation of Reformers, and is founded upon
Scriptures: the idea of “your lot in life”. In other words, Beza accepts that,
due to divine providence, human beings find themselves in different roles and,
to you his term, “stations”, and that we should seek to engage in civil life
based upon our station. This is nothing like the notion of a “caste system”, in
which it is impossible and even immoral to change your “station”. Rather, Beza
seems to think that it may be possible for a person’s “station” to change.
In explaining the duty of “subjects”
in relation to a recognized civil ruler who may have “fallen” into Tyranny,
Beza distinguishes between 3 types of subjects occupying 3 stations:[14]
(1)
Private
citizens: a private
citizen is any individual citizen that is not formally involved in public
administration or politics (local or otherwise)
(2)
Subordinate
magistrates: These are citizens
who are involved in public administration and politics, but who are responsible
to the supreme ruler. He further elaborates on the specific types of public
roles he has in mind, saying that he is not referring to those who may work in
the immediate presence of the highest magistrate on a regular basis, but, “those
who perform public and state duties, touching either on the administration of
Justice, or related to war, in a Monarchy they are said to be accountable not
to the King, but to the Crown or the Kingdom. ”[15]
He goes on to give the names of types of positions which would fall under this
station, using examples from ancient Rome, from ancient Israel, and from his
own time period. From ancient Rome: consuls, praetors, city governors,
provincial governors, senators, and other officials of the republic or empire.[16] From
ancient Israel: the leaders of the 12 tribes, captains of the different
groups of people established by Moses, etc.[17] From his own time: dukes, marquises,
counts, viscounts, barons, squires, mayors, vicars, consuls, judges, and so on.[18] It
should be fairly obvious that in contemporary Canadian terms, he would
be referring to local provincial and federal representatives, members of
senate, judges (at any level of the courts), mayors, leaders of the army, and
the local and federal police chiefs or fire chiefs. Anybody who holds an
official public role and has a say in the administration of public affairs.
(3)
Superior
Subordinate magistrates:
these are magistrates who are not sovereign, but who are so positioned as to be
able to keep the supreme ruler from abusing his or her power. He refers to these
positions as “Orders or Estates”.[19]
In contemporary Canadian politics, this level might be understood either as the
Caucus of the Prime Minister or Premier, or the Supreme Court of Canada.
Having established three basic stations in political
life (which, I would propose, can be fairly easily transposed into almost any
form of government),[20]
Beza then describes the duties of each level, and the rights that they have in
relationship to a Tyrant. In this section I will only briefly describe their
basic duties and will return to their relationship to the Tyrant until after we
have seen what Beza means by a Tyrant or Tyranny.
For Beza, private citizens have no civil responsibilities,
per se,[21]
as they do not hold public office, nor have they been given any civil duties such
as would accompany public office. This leads Beza to suggest that, regardless
of whether the private citizens have openly and freely agreed to be ruled by a
particular leader, or whether the supreme ruler is a tyrant who ceased control
of the nation, unless a person receives a miraculous call from God, private
citizens do not have the God-given right or duty to rise up against tyrants or
to disobey them.[22]
The duty of the private citizen is to obey the magistrates that are in place, to
honor them, and to persevere in prayer for his nation and his leaders.[23] Especially
in the case when we have elected our leaders, our responsibility is to honor
that contract, even if the leaders (by becoming Tyrants), do not.[24]
In this, Beza agrees fully with Calvin’s claims about the duties of the private
citizen. Where Beza differs from Calvin, it is not a disagreement, but a
development and nuancing of Calvin’s thought. That is, Beza applies the notion
of civil “stations” to the question of civil duties and responsibilities, and develops
the possibility for opposing tyrannical rule in a way that Calvin would most
likely have accepted. The duty and responsibility and right to oppose tyranny
is not held by the private citizen, but by the subordinate magistrates.
The subordinate
magistrates or civil leaders have various duties specifically related to
their respective roles (i.e. – mayors, judges, police or fire chiefs, provincial
or federal representatives, etc.).[25]
The subordinate magistrates are frequently placed in their positions by the
supreme magistrate, receive their responsibilities from the supreme magistrate,
and are accountable to the magistrate, but, their office depends upon (and is
ultimately accountable to), not any particular supreme magistrate, but the kingdom
or nation itself.[26] These
magistrates are delegated their roles by the supreme magistrate, with a contract
to uphold the honor and duties of their particular office.[27]
The primary duty of the highest level of
subordinate magistrates is both to defend and support the supreme magistrate
against those who would attempt to diminish his power, and to ensure that the
supreme magistrate respects his duties towards the people.[28] They
have the right and ability to confer power to the supreme magistrate and to
remove it if the supreme magistrate becomes an evil Tyrant.[29]
Now, what does Beza mean by Tyrant or Tyranny?
What Does Beza mean by “Tyrant”?
Beza discusses the notion of a
Tyrant on a number of occasions in this treatise, and it is by bringing each of
these thoughts together that we grasp a clear understanding of just what he means
by a Tyrant, and what he doesn’t. First of all, he clearly distinguishes
between two types of tyrant based upon how they come to rule over a nation or people.[30]
The first type of tyrant is a civil leader who has ceases the control of
their own country and leadership over their own people. In this case, the way
by which the leader ceases the control may either be peacefully (or even with
the assent of the people), or by violence.
The second type of tyrant is the civil ruler
who ceases the control of a country and people other than their own, as in when
one country conquers another country. In this case, a foreign leader is using their
power and resources (military or otherwise) to dominate and take control of a
neighbouring country. The second type of tyrant is of less interest for Beza, and
for our purposes, as it is clear that all citizens, regardless of their
station, have a moral obligation to protect their country.
Not all Behaviours Characterize a Tyrant
Now, Beza does not think that just because a body of people
are ruled by a single ruler, that this is therefore a tyranny and illegitimate
use of temporal power. In fact, he even allows for the possibility that a ruler
may began poorly (i.e. - ceasing power and control), but may then rectify the
original default, if the people assent, without constraint, to be governed by that
single ruler.[31]
Throughout this text, Beza adds a number of other nuances to qualify his notion
of a tyrant.
First of all, Beza notes that there may situations in
which a dictatorship may actually be necessary for the good of the people. Beza
says, for example, that “, in relation to the power of a Dictator, it is true
that it was not called upon; but it was not in use unless there was an overwhelming
situation that made it necessary, and this only for a short time, such as 6
months more or less. And what is more, this sovereign power, when they called
upon the people, they agreed, as in, it seems, what happened to Rome around her
foundation.”[32]
In other words, if there is an overwhelming situation which requires decisions
to be made rapidly by the civil magistrate, it would not be considered tyranny if
the leaders of the country took control of the country and made decisions of a
dictatorial nature (not consulting the wishes of the people), and, this, for
the good of the people. Beza notes, this should not, of course, be for a
prolonged period of time (his example of a short period of time is 6 months).
Secondly, Beza notes, in relation to that the conquering
of a nation, that, “if the condition proposed by the conqueror, and accepted by
the vanquished, is really only burdensome and distressing, and concerns nothing
more than discomforts of this present life; I admit that in such a case, one
must the engagement in higher esteem than these comforts”[33]
In other words, if the dictator’s requirements and conditions present merely a
discomfort and burden in this earthly temporal life, then the people who are
under this leaders thumb should be willing to submit to these requirements. There
are, of course, certain types of demands which should not be accepted, nor
submitted to, but we will address these subjects later.
Finally, Beza also thinks that excess in either the
application of laws, taxation, or other abuses of power is not necessarily
tyranny. He says, “And we must also note this point, that a Prince acting in
excess in these points or in some others resembling these, must not be held to
be, for this, a Tyrant, under the claim that he is given to excessive luxury,
or is greedy, or is given to some other vice.”[34] This
may seem counter-intuitive, but it is actually quite down to earth. That is, if
we think about any human use of power (or use of anything for that matter), it
is very rare that humans apply the proper amount of power. How many times do we
break things, by accident, because we thought we were using the amount of strength
required, only to discover that it was too much. Our reaction to the surprise? “Wow,
I didn’t think I was putting that much pressure on it.” Or, “Woah, he doesn’t
know his own strength.” Just think about trying to follow the speed limit. For
must people, even when they use the “cruise control”, they very rarely are able
to maintain the precise limit which is required. The point, here, is that it is
not the simple fact that a leader uses excess measures, power, or is even
addicted to any number of vices, that the leader should be considered a Tyrant.
Recognizing the Tyrant
Beza’s reflections on Tyranny are quite
helpful, as, at various places he provides his definition of what a Tyrant is
and their key characteristic, their primary purpose, and the types of actions
that they engage in which are unacceptable, and which merit some form of public
intervention. We have seen what a Tyrant is not, consider, now, what is meant
by tyranny.
Beza defines tyranny as follows, “For
what else is Tyranny than power turned against the law?”[35]
The idea here is that a Tyrant has not respect for the laws of the country, and,
specifically, Natural law. It is not just that the tyrant does not, privately, obey
the laws of the country, but that the tyrant has not respect for natural law in
general and the laws of nations. This is reaffirmed when Beza notes that, “as
such, Tyranny is marked by a confirmed malice accompanied by an overturning of
the State and of those laws which are foundational to a Kingdom.”[36] Tyrants,
then, do all that they can to overthrow the rule of law in their own state, establishing
their every whim and desire as law. Rather than the good of the people, it is
their own good that they pursue. This is, in fact, how Beza describes the Tyrants
purpose: “they do not claim to be happy with their subjects, for any other
reason than to satisfy their evil desires, to the ruin and destruction of their
subjects”[37]
A Tyrant, then, is a ruler who has not respect for the laws of the country
that they have gained control of, and who seek no good other than their own,
even if this entails the destruction and ruin of those under their power.
What kinds of actions characterize
such a leader? The most common action attributed to Tyrants is the manifestly violent
overthrow, intimidation, and oppression of the people,[38] however,
Beza includes a number of other actions which merit some sort of public
intervention for the good of the people: (1) Forced human sacrifices to false
Gods, or just that the people are required to give themselves, or their children,
to the leader so that he may do as he pleases with them (either killing them,
using them as slaves, or making them serve his sexual lusts);[39]
(2) Forced human mutilation (or, perhaps, the disarming of the people), such that
the people would be incapable of rebelling against the tyrant;[40] or
(3) the obligation to renounce the true religion, or the requirement to engage
in idolatry (the worship of a false God);[41]
(4) Killing or raping whomever he wishes;[42]
(5) Stealing the belongings and lands of the people,[43] and
so on. It is, in fact, in this context that Beza notes that simply requiring
people to obey laws which are either distressing or which render them unhappy
or uncomfortable does not a Tyrant make.[44]
It is clear that, for Beza, a leader
who engages in open violence against the Law and against his people, in the
pursuit of his own pleasures and not the good of the people, is a Tyrant. This
is a leader whose commands are both impious (hateful of true religion) and
unjust (hateful of the rule of law). A leader who may make excessive demands,
may engage in forms of dictatorship for periods of time (specifically in
relation to calamitous situations), or who is wasteful, lustful, and excessive
in various vices, is not for all that a Tyrant.
Obedience and Opposition to a Civil Ruler
We have considered what Beza
understands as Tyranny, and what doesn’t count as Tyranny. With this in hand,
we can now come to the question of when it is right to oppose a Tyrant. As far
as Beza is concerned, all subjects of all levels of civil life are required to always
obey the supreme ruler,[45]
even if the demands are overbearing or uncomfortable.[46] However,
what happens when a supreme ruler becomes a Tyrant and makes demands which are either
unjust or impious? Beza’s response is 2-fold. He first mentions the proper
reaction of all subjects, and then takes that general rule and applies it to
each level of civil life.
First of all, by making
demands which are either impious or unjust, the civil magistrate has put himself
or herself in opposition to God (from whom their station and the power
associated with that station flow), and, thus, to obey them in this matter would
be to disobey God. As such, they are to be disobeyed in these matters (see the
examples given above for situations in which it is better to obey God than
man).[47] Furthermore,
in these situations, all citizens must do what they can, without going beyond
the rights of their respective stations, to defend lawful rule against the
tyrant.[48] However,
in laying down this principle, Beza notes that our respective station in civil
life imposes certain restriction on this general rule.[49]
Secondly, in regard to the levels of civil life, Beza notes that there is a
general principle which need to be followed: If I am wronged by a person of the
same level as I (private citizen vs private citizen, or subordinate magistrate
vs. subordinate magistrate), then I am to appeal my situation to the higher
level of civil life. If I am wronged by a person of a higher level of civil
life (private citizen vs. subordinate magistrate), then I am to appeal my case
to the level which is higher than that level which offended me.[50] In
no case should the private citizen take up arms against a higher station,
without having received the authority to do so from a higher station.[51]
Especially in relation to Christians, Beza argues that the Christian is to “suffer
injury from all but to injure none.”[52]
In this, again, Beza is entirely in agreement with Luther, Melanchthon, and
Calvin. The Christian is not to openly oppose, on his own authority, the civil
magistrate. However, suggests Beza, this does not mean that Tyranny cannot be
opposed. How, then can tyranny be opposed? Beza looks at each level of civil life
and explains what is to be done.
On Opposing a Tyrant
Private Citizens
The role and responsibility of the Private Citizen
could be summarized as follows, first, contact your immediate superior (the
subordinate civil servant), then, keep your head down or get out of town. In
relation to the role of the Private Citizen in either protecting against tyranny
or opposing a Tyrant, Beza teaches that their primary role is to obey, pray,
and leave if they can’t persevere. He says, “I say that unless one receives an
extraordinary call from God [he is thinking, here, of the Judges of Israel], of
which I will not speak, no private citizen is legally permitted, upon his own
private authority, to oppose the power of the Tyrant with violence; As such, he
must either leave and go elsewhere, or depending upon God, bear the yoke
patiently, so long as (as was said at the beginning) he does not allow himself
to be used by the Tyranny against another person, or to be kept from doing what
he owes to God and to his neighbour.”[53] Note,
here, the duty of the private citizen is (1) bear the yoke patiently, not neglecting
to fulfill one’s duties to God and neighbour, or (2) if it becomes to difficult
to bear, leave.
Beza goes on to note that a tyrant who takes another
country by force should be opposed, as just war theory allows, but, that the private
citizen is not entitled to depose by force a Tyrant from his own country. Beza
makes this point based upon 2 arguments, 1 from Scriptures and the other from Natural
Law. Based upon Natural Law, Beza notes that to use force or riots to depose a
Tyrant or to object to his ruling would be to fight evil with evil and to make
matters worse by destroy public peace and order.[54]
Beza then points to Romans 13:5 and 1 Peter 2:17 to show that the Bible clearly
“not only forbids private citizens from resisting the Magistrate (superior or
inferior), but also commands the private citizen to obey him for the sake of
his conscience.”[55]
Beza then provides the examples of the Martyrs who willingly died rather than
rise up against the Tyrants.
Later in this same treatise, Beza summarizes the duties
of the Private Citizen as follows, “I reply, in relation to particular
citizens, that if they have not been authorized, either by the inferior Magistrates
or by the most sane part of the States (as we will say later [that is the highest
level of civil duty, under the supreme ruler]), then they have no other remedy
than repentance and patience accompanied by prayers, which God never ignores, and
without which all other remedies, regardless of how legitimate they may be, are
in danger of being condemned by God. However, this does not stop the particular
citizens from having recourse to the inferior Magistrates, reminding them of
their respective duty, by which, being employed by the saner part of these, I
have already said what they owe to God and to their country.”[56]
Note, here, that Beza is very clear that private citizens do not have the
authority to go out on their own and to oppose the supreme magistrate. This is
not to say that they can “do” nothing. Rather, Beza’s answer is not only in
line with Calvin and the earlier Reformers, and also highlights the importance
of prayer.
In agreement with Calvin, Beza reminds the private
citizen that if they find themselves ruled by a Tyrant, the best thing they can
do is realize that this is a judgment from God, on their nation, and repent. He
then reiterates what he has already said, the private citizen, based upon their
station in civil life, is called upon to bear patiently the yoke placed upon
them, and pray. Beza reminds us of what we so often forget. Prayer is the most
powerful thing that can be done in this situation! In fact, all possible
actions, regardless of how legal and legitimate they may be, risk being
condemned by God if they are engaged in without prayer. Prayer should always be
first. Prayer for ourselves, prayer for our nation, prayer for our leaders (as
evil and tyrannical as they may be). The first prayer should be repentance.
Finally, other than patiently bearing the yoke and
praying, the private citizen can also call upon the subordinate magistrate and
remind them of their duties to their country and their people. If, at this
point, the subordinate magistrates call upon the private citizens to rise up,
they are authorized to do so. Beza repeatedly comes back to these points, and
reminds us constantly of the role of the Private Citizen:[57] (1)
submit patiently and bear the yoke put upon you, out of a good
conscience and submission to God, enduring the divine punishment; (2) Pray;
(3) If all else fails, and you are able, Leave.
The Lower
Magistrates
The Lower Magistrates, of both the
lower and higher levels, are servants first of country, and second of the
supreme magistrate. They, therefore, have the duty before God and man, to
consistently act so as to prevent the rise of Tyranny, and to oppose the Tyrant
in the case that he or she ceases power. They are private citizens, but, because
of their station in civil life, they have this higher power and responsibility
towards their country and their people. The lower levels of subordinate
magistrates must call upon the higher level to restrain or depose the tyrant.
In the case that the higher level of subordinate magistrates will not so act,
the lower level is fully entitled to lead the people to rise up, using arms if
necessary, to depose the Tyrant, and reaffirm the right rule of Law.[58]
Beza provides 3 clear axioms which
should guide such actions:
1.
“That
it be a clear and manifest Tyranny.”[59] (See
the previous section for what Beza considers to be a clear and manifest Tyranny.)
If this first step is not the case, then the 2 following steps should not be
taken.
2.
“That
we should not take up arms until we have tried ever other possible remedy.”[60]
3.
“That
we have clearly determined not only that it is legitimate, but that it is also
expedient, being certain that the remedy is not worse than the illness.”[61]
Beza argues that all legal means must first have been
patiently attempted, leaving the subordinate magistrates no other choice but
open and/or armed revolt. Open revolt against the rule of a Tyrant is
legitimate only when engaged in by a subordinate magistrate, and it is their
responsibility to so act if the situation requires.
On Religious Persecution
In concluding, we might ask, but what if we are persecuted
for our religion? What if the sovereign magistrate seeks to force us to engage
in idolatry?[62]
Beza’s answer is not different from what we have already seen. It is the God-given
responsibility of the sovereign magistrate (and of the subordinate magistrates)
to uphold right religion,[63]
but, if they do not, if they attempt to compel us to engage in idolatry, we can
clearly not obey. What then can we do? We should not be surprised to read Beza’s
response: the Private Citizen must bear the yoke of persecution for refusing to
bow to a false God, or leave the country. Subordinate Magistrates may, however,
oppose the supreme magistrate in the ways permitted by law.
[1]Alister
E. McGrath, Reformation Thought: An Introduction, 4th ed (Malden and Oxford:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 30.
[2]Eire
notes that the « arming » of the developing European nations took
place between 1450 and 1560 (Carlos M. N. Eire, Reformations: The Early
Modern World, 1450-1650 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 16.
[3]Eire, Reformations, 17.
[4]Eire, Reformations, 18.
[5]Eire, Reformations, 7.
[6]All quotes taken from Theodore de Bèze,
Du droit des Magistrats sur leurs subjets (1574). My translations.
[7]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 54.
[8]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 54-55.
[9]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 55-56.
[10]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 56.
[11]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 12.
[12]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 29. He says, « De là s’ensuit que la puissance des
Magistrats, quelques grands & souverain qu’ils soient dépend de celle du
public qui les a esleus en ce degré, & non au contraire. »
[13]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 3-4, 13.
[15]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 21. My translation. In
French, « mais ceux-là qui ont les charges publiques, & de l’estat,
soit touchant l’administration de Justice, soit du fait de la guerre, appellez
pour ceste cause en une monarchie Officiers de la couronne, & plustost du
Roiaume que du Roi, estant ces deux choses biens différentes. »
[16]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 21-22.
[17]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 22.
[18]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 22.
[19]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 28-29.
[20]There will
be important nuances which needs to be made in relation to the forms of
democracy that we find in contemporary Western nations (such as Canada and the
United States), where, in theory at least, the people are sovereign, and
politicians are public servants elected by the people and accountable to the
people.
[21]This is one
of those places where contemporary forms of democracy would need to nuance
these claims. For example, in Canada, it is not just a right, but technically it
is a duty of all private citizens to vote about who they wish to rule.
[22]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 19.
[23]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 19.
[24]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 19-20.
[25]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 21-22.
[26]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 22.
[27]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 23.
[28]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 29.
[29]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 30.
[30]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 13.
[31]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 16.
[32]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 32. My translation. In French, « Et quant à la puissance
du Dictateur, il est bien vrai qu’on n’en appelait point : mais elle n’était
en usage qu’en cas de nécessité survenante, et que pour bien peu de temps, assavoir
six mois pour le plus. Et qui plus est, cette souverain puissance, quand on en
a appelé au Peuple, s’y est condescendue, comme il appert de ce qui advint à Rome
l’an de la fondation d’icelle. »
[33]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 56-7. My translation. In French, « Mais si la condition
proposée par le vainquer, & acceptee par le vaincu, est tant seulement rude
& aspre, & ne concerne que l’incommodité de ceste vie présente : J’avoue
qu’en tel cas il faut avoir plus d’égard à son serment, qu’à tout commoditez. »
[34]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 76. My translation. In
French, « Et faut encores noter ce point, Qu’un Prince excédant en cest
endroit ou en quelque autre semblable, ne doit estre incontinent tenu pour
Tyran, sous umbre qu’il sera ou prodigue, ou avaricieux, ou addoné à tel autre
vice. »
[35]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 33-4. My translation. In
French, « Car qu’est-ce autre chose de Tyrannie, qu’une puissance exercée
contre les loix? »
[36]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 76. My translation. In
French, « ainsi la Tyrannie emporte une malice confermée avec un
renversement d’Etat & des loix fondamentalles d’un Royaume. »
[37]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 63. My translation. In
French, « ils ne pretendent de jouir de leurs subjets, sinon pour
satisfaire à leurs malheureuses cupidités, à la ruine & destruction de
ceux-ci. »
[38]Remember,
there are some actions which some might see as a form of tyranny, buth which
Beza says may be found even in legitimate rulers.
[39]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 56.
[40]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 56.
[41]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 56.
[42]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 57.
[43]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 57.
[44]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 56-7.
[45]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 3.
[46]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 56-7, 76.
[47]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 3-4, 6.
[48]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 15-16.
[49]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 6. Beza says, « Qu’un chacun doit avoir esgard en tel cas
a sa vocation, soit generale & publique, ou particuliere. »
[50]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 7-8.
[51]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 8-9.
[52]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 9. My translation. In
French, « gist à souffrir injure de tous & ne le faire à aucun. »
[53]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 19. My translation. In
French, « je dy que sans extraordinaire vocation de Dieu, à laquelle je ne
touche point, il n’est licite à aucun particulier d’opposer force à la force du
Tyran de son authorité privée : ainsil faut ou qu’il se retire ailleurs,
ou qu’aiant recours à Dieu il souffre le joug, sans touteffois (comme il a esté
dit au commencement) se faire ministre de la Tyrannie contre quelqu’un, ou rien
obmettre de ce qu’il doit à Dieu, & à son prochain. »
[54]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 20.
[55]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 20. My translation. In
French, « des particuliers, non seulement defend de résister au Magistrat
souverain ou inferieur, mais aussi commande de lui obéir à cause de la
conscience. »
[56]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 65-6. My translation. In
French, « je respon, quat aux particuliers, s’ils ne sont authorisez ou
par Magistrats inférieurs, ou par la plus saine partie des Estats (comme nous
dirons tantost) qu’ils n’ont autre remede que repentance & patience avec
les prières, lesquelles Dieu ne mesprisera jamais, & sans lesquelles tout
autre remede, quelque légitime qu’il soit, est en danger d’estre maudit de
Dieu. Mais cela n’empesche pas que les mesmes particuliers ne puissent avoir
recours à leurs Magistrats subalternes, les somas de leur devoir, par lesquels
estans emploiez ou par la plus saines partie d’iceux, j’ai desja dit ce qu’ils
doivent à Dieu & à leur Patrie. »
[57]Cf. « quant aux personnes privées,
Que si elles ne sont authoriseespar quelque légitime Magistrat subalterne, ou
par les Estats de la nation, il faut vraiment ou qu’elles se retirent attendas
un meilleur temps, ou qu’elles tendent les espaules demandans patience à Dieu,
& proffitas sous ses corrections. (Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 68.) » Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des Magistrats, 74.
(Here, he repeats the same principle, adding that Christians who are private
citizens are not permitted to rise up against Tyrants in any other way than
through patient perseverance in prayer. He suggests that they may even have
recourse to imprecatory prayers.).
[58]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 66, 68.
[59]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 67. My Translation. In French, « que la Tyrannie soit toute
notoire. »
[60]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 67. My Translation. In French, « Qu’on ne vienne jamais aux
armes qu’après avoir essaié tous autres remedes ».
[61]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 67. My Translation. In French, « qu’on ait bien considéré
non seulement ce qui est licite, mais aussi ce qui est expedient, de peur que le
remede ne soit pire que la maladie. »
[62]It is worth
noting that, based upon what we have seen in this exposition of Beza’s approach
to civil duties, the temporary order to cease all public meetings (including
church meetings) based upon a threat to the well-being of society falls under
the right and just rulings that a supreme or even subordinate magistrate may
enact, given the right circumstances. The amount of time that this temporary
order may remain in place will depend upon the gravity of the situation. Beza
would argue that individual church bodies do not have the right to rise up
against such an order, and to do so would be to act against the divine order. Those
who do have the right to rise up against such order would be the subordinate
magistrates, which the private citizens must appeal to in order to change the
policies of the supreme magistrate. Again, there are important nuances which
need to be added in order to apply these principles to contemporary forms of
democracy, but they are applicable.
[63]Theodore de Bèze, Du droit des
Magistrats, 79-81.
